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(Original Signature of Member)

119TH CONGRESS
2D SESSION

H. R.

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, to make improvements relating to cooperation between the United States and Israel to counter unmanned systems across warfighting domains, and for other purposes.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Mr. GOTTHEIMER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on _____

A BILL

To amend the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, to make improvements relating to cooperation between the United States and Israel to counter unmanned systems across warfighting domains, and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-
2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

4 This Act may be cited as the “U.S.-Israel Anti-Killer
5 Drone Act of 2026”.

1 **SEC. 2. IMPROVEMENTS RELATING TO UNITED STATES-**

2 **ISRAEL COOPERATION TO COUNTER UN-**

3 **MANNED SYSTEMS.**

4 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

5 (1) The growing arsenal of unmanned systems

6 of Iran includes—

7 (A) unmanned systems that engage in in-
8 telligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and

9 (B) armed unmanned systems capable of
10 striking battlefield targets, including loitering
11 munitions, also known as “suicide drones” or
12 “one-way attack drones”.

13 (2) Iran-origin unmanned systems represent a
14 threat to the Armed Forces and facilities of the
15 United States in the Middle East, as well as to
16 United States allies and partners such as Israel,
17 Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

18 (3) In February 2018, Iran allegedly launched
19 an armed unmanned aerial vehicle from Syria into
20 Israeli airspace which was ultimately destroyed by
21 Israeli warplanes.

22 (4) In September 2019, Iran launched cruise
23 missiles and loitering munitions at key oil installa-
24 tions in Saudi Arabia.

25 (5) Throughout the takeover of Yemen by the
26 Houthi, beginning in 2014 and continuing into the

1 present, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
2 Quds-Force, the al-Ghadir Missile Command of the
3 Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Aerospace
4 Force, and the Research and Self-Sufficiency Jihad
5 organization of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard
6 Corps has supported the capabilities of Yemeni
7 rebels, including through the provision of unmanned
8 systems and other relevant technology, such as
9 cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Such support
10 enables the Houthis to routinely strike civilian tar-
11 gets in both Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
12 Emirates.

13 (6) In January 2021, Iran-backed Shiite militia
14 groups in Iraq launched armed unmanned aerial ve-
15 hicles at Saudi Arabia.

16 (7) In March 2021, Iran attempted to send two
17 delta-wing unmanned aerial vehicles toward Israel
18 which were ultimately downed by Israeli warplanes
19 over the territory of an undisclosed Arab country.

20 (8) In July 2021, Iran launched an attack em-
21 ploying unmanned aerial vehicles, including loitering
22 munitions against a Liberian-flagged, Israeli-oper-
23 ated tanker, “M/T Mercer Street”, near the coast of
24 Oman that killed two people, a British and a Roma-
25 nian national.

16 (11) In May 2022, Iran inaugurated an un-
17 manned system factory in Tajikistan to manufacture
18 and export the Ababil-2, a multipurpose unmanned
19 system with reconnaissance, combat, and suicide ca-
20 pabilities.

21 (12) On June 2, 2022, Iran-backed Hezbollah
22 sent three unmanned aerial vehicles toward the
23 Israeli-controlled Karish gas field, one of which was
24 intercepted by an F-16 fighter jet, and two of which

1 were intercepted by Barak 8 missiles launched from
2 the Sa'ar 5-class corvette "INS Eilat".

3 (13) On July 2, 2022, the Israeli military re-
4 portedly shot down three unmanned aerial vehicles
5 launched by Hezbollah in the vicinity of where an
6 Israeli gas platform had been recently installed in
7 the Mediterranean Sea.

8 (14) On July 14, 2022, the United States and
9 Israel adopted the Joint Declaration on the U.S.-
10 Israel Strategic Partnership, reaffirming the un-
11 breakable bonds between the two countries and the
12 enduring commitment of the United States to the
13 security of Israel.

14 (15) In late August 2022, Iran reportedly sent
15 its first batch of Shahed-136 unmanned systems to
16 Russia for use against Ukraine. While Russia is re-
17 branding these systems the Geran-2, United States
18 officials revealed the agreement in the summer of
19 2022.

20 (16) On September 12, 2022, Brigadier Gen-
21 eral Kioumars Heydari, who heads the ground forces
22 of the Armed Forces of Iran, announced that the
23 Armed Forces of Iran had developed the Arash-2
24 unmanned system specifically designed to attack Tel
25 Aviv and Haifa.

1 (17) On November 13, 2022, and on February
2 10, 2023, Iran-origin unmanned systems allegedly
3 targeted Israeli-owned oil tankers off the coast of
4 Oman.

5 (18) Since 2022, Russia has used Iran-origin
6 Shahed unmanned aerial vehicles equipped with en-
7 hanced navigation systems to evade Ukrainian air
8 defenses, resulting in hundreds of civilian casualties.

9 (19) On February 14, 2023, United States
10 forces in Syria reportedly shot down an Iran-origin
11 unmanned aerial vehicle surveilling United States
12 positions around oil facilities.

13 (20) On October 7, 2023, Hamas terrorists
14 launched a brutal, unprovoked attack from Gaza
15 into Israel, killing more than 1,200 people, including
16 at least 30 Americans, according to the Israeli mili-
17 tary and the Department of State. The attack in-
18 volved a significant number of unmanned systems.

19 (21) Between late 2023 and 2024, United
20 States forces in Iraq and Syria were repeatedly tar-
21 geted by Iran-backed militias using armed un-
22 manned systems, resulting in American casualties.

23 (22) In June 2025, Iran launched a series of
24 unmanned system attacks against targets in Israel,
25 including both military installations and critical in-

1 frastructure. The scale and coordination of the at-
2 tack demonstrated the expanding operational capa-
3 bilities of Iran.

4 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-
5 gress that the United States should—

6 (1) enhance ongoing cooperation with Israel in
7 researching, developing, and fielding, as expedi-
8 tiously as possible, mutually beneficial technologies
9 and capabilities to counter unmanned systems, for
10 the purpose of addressing common military require-
11 ments and growing threats;

12 (2) exchange with Israel information about the
13 evolving threat of Iran-origin unmanned systems;

14 (3) conduct joint training exercises and develop
15 information-sharing mechanisms to maximize the ex-
16 change of technical expertise, data, and tactics re-
17 lated to emerging unmanned systems and associated
18 threats;

19 (4) coordinate with acquisition program offices
20 of the United States Armed Forces and Israeli mili-
21 tary service departments, components, and com-
22 mands to expedite the deployment of relevant sys-
23 tems and enhance military readiness; and

24 (5) use the United States-Israel Operations-
25 Technology Working Group established pursuant to

1 section 1299M(c) of the National Defense Author-
2 ization Act for Fiscal Year 2021 (Public Law 116–
3 283; 134 Stat. 4014), or any successor working
4 group, as the epicenter of such efforts.

5 (c) REPORT ON UNITED STATES-ISRAEL COOPERA-
6 TION TO COUNTER UNMANNED SYSTEMS.—Section 1278
7 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
8 2020 (Public Law 116–92; 133 Stat. 1702; 22 U.S.C.
9 8606 note) is amended—

10 (1) in subsection (b)(4), by striking
11 “\$55,000,000” and inserting “\$100,000,000”;
12 (2) by redesignating subsections (e) and (f) as
13 subsections (f) and (g), respectively; and
14 (3) by inserting after subsection (d) the fol-
15 lowing new subsections:

16 “(e) ANNUAL REPORTS.—The Secretary of Defense
17 shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress
18 on an annual basis a report containing—

19 “(1) a description of the activities authorized in
20 subsection (a)(1) conducted during the preceding fis-
21 cal year, including—

22 “(A) an assessment of progress made by
23 the United States and Israel in addressing
24 threats and requirements relating to unmanned

1 systems (as such term is defined in section 319
2 of title 14, United States Code);

3 “(B) an assessment of the harmonization
4 of such activities authorized in subsection (a)(1)
5 with other programs of the United States Gov-
6 ernment or programs of contractors of the De-
7 partment of Defense;

8 “(C) an update on efforts to transition ca-
9 pabilities to acquisition program managers for
10 fielding by the United States Armed Forces or
11 Israeli military services, components, and com-
12 mands; and

13 “(D) recommendations for future activities
14 to be conducted under this section and associ-
15 ated funding; and

16 “(2) an assessment of the threat to the United
17 States and Israel posed by unmanned aerial systems
18 from Iran and associated proxies of Iran, including
19 an assessment of deployed or otherwise available
20 anti-unmanned aircraft capabilities of the United
21 States or Israel and the adequacy of such capabili-
22 ties to offset such threat.”.

23 (d) UNMANNED SYSTEM DEFINED.—In this section,
24 the term “unmanned system” has the meaning given that
25 term in section 319 of title 14, United States Code.